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RIGHT AND WRONG WAYS OF DOING AWAY WITH
COMMERCIAL AIR CRASH LITIGATION:
PROFESSOR CHALK'S "MARKET




M ANY COMMENTATORS have been justifiably criti-
cal of the way tort law operates in cases of domestic
commercial airline crashes.' The indictment of the ex-
isting private litigation regime includes the following
charges. The administrative costs that tort law generates
in disposing of such claims are indecently great.2 Victims
* Stephen D. Sugarman Professor of Law, The University of California, Berke-
ley. B.S. 1964, Northwestern University; J.D. 1967, Northwestern University.
I See, e.g., Note, Domestic Commercial Aircraft Tort Litigation: A Proposal for Absolute
Liability of the Carriers, 23 STAN. L. REV. 569, 571 (1971) [hereinafter Note,A Propo-
salfor Absolute Liability]. For criticisms of the tort system generally, most of which
are applicable to the problem of air crashes, see, e.g., Sugarman, Doing Away With
Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985);J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY-
NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).
2 See Martin, The Manufacturer's View of "No-Fault, " 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 223, 234
(1974). "Most calculations show that the aviation accident victims, their estates,
and heirs ultimately receive no more than fifteen percent to twenty percent of the
total amount spent in insuring, defending, and paying claims and litigation." Id.
An earlier inquiry revealed that plaintiffs received forty-seven cents of each dollar
paid by the airline for insurance premiums, which would be reduced to approxi-
mately thirty cents on the dollar once their attorneys were paid. See Note, A Propo-
salforAbsolute Liability, supra note 1, at 588-89. This latter estimate, however, does
not include defendants' expenses in addition to their cost of insurance, including
most importantly, their expenses of cooperation in mounting a defense. More-
over, it is not clear that either estimate considers the public costs attributable to
handling air crash litigation.
In explaining why the benefit proportion of total costs is so low, some critics
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and their heirs often wait intolerably long periods of time
for compensation.3 When eventually paid, this compensa-
tion varies considerably due to factors that many com-
mentators believe should be irrelevant, such as the crash
location, the victims' place of residence, the heirs' ability
to endure the delay, or the talent of the claimant's law-
yer.4 Regarding such advocates, many often find revolt-
ing the sight (or report) of aggressive plaintiff lawyers
setting up hospitality suites in major hotels located near
the crash site in hope of garnering clients from among the
grieving heirs.5 Moreover, many find it both unseemly
and inappropriately regressive that the families of de-
ceased passengers who had been sitting next to each
other and had paid the same amount for their tickets re-
ceive entirely different tort awards because of the dece-
dents' different earning levels.6  Furthermore, the
focus on the fees the lawyers obtain. Others point to the high costs of investiga-
tion and expert witnesses brought about by the difficulty of proving one's case in
air crash settings. Yet others note that costs cascade because of the tendency of
commercial air cases to be marked by multiple defendants and cross complaints.
The routine marketing and administrative costs associated with liability insurance
are a factor as well.
- See Chalk, A New Proposal for the Reform of Commercial Air Crash Litigation, 50 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 219, 241-42 (1985).
4 See Chalk, supra note 3, at 243-44; Kennelly, Aviation-The Needfor Uniform Leg-
islation, 48J. AIR L. & CoM. 613, 613-15 (1983) [hereinafter Need for Uniform Legis-
lation]; Kennelly, Litigation Implications of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American
Airlines Flight 191, 15J. MAR. L. REV. 273, 274-77 (1982).
Because of the "collateral source" rule, many, but not all, air crash plaintiffs
recover in tort for losses already compensated by other sources such as health
insurance, disability insurance, life insurance, Social Security, etc. See generally
Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1478 (1966) (discussing methods of loss allocation among the injurer, the injured,
and his collateral benefactor).
See, e.g., Dallas Morning News, Aug. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 3 (San Francisco attor-
ney, Melvin Belli, "set up shop" in a Dallas hotel two days after the crash of Delta
Air Lines Flight 191). For further comments on the solicitation of plaintiffs in air
crash cases and other alleged unsavory practices by lawyers in this field, see Mar-
tin, supra note 2, at 223-31. Some advocates of reform are highly offended by
courtroom battles in which the parties dispute how much pain and suffering the
air crash victim endured before his death. See Schwartz, Professor O'Connell's Method
for Ending Insult to Injury: Can It Solve the Air Crash Litigation Dilemma, 41 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 199, 202 (1975).
11 First and business class passengers typically pay more for their tickets than do
economy or coach class passengers and, as a class, probably have higher earnings
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substantive law in this area is in disarray. Courts typically
require proof of negligence before air carriers are found
liable but hold airplane manufacturers strictly liable if the
crash arose due to a defect in the plane.7 In instances
when neither a defect nor negligence can be shown, as in
cases of an unpreventable terrorist attack or unexpected
bad weather, the tort system is not designed to provide
any compensation from the airline industry. Yet, the vic-
tims and their heirs in such situations are in as much need
as are those who have a tort remedy.8 In short, I have
little doubt that the flying public is paying much more for
the tort system in the price of air travel than it receives in
benefits from the tort law. 9 The problem, nonetheless, is
that would be lost in case of a fatal crash. Nonetheless, considerable variation in
income would exist within any group of passengers paying the same fare.
7 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (imposing strict lia-
bility on manufacturers for product defects) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 520A, comment e (1977) (limiting the strict liability of air carriers to
ground damage). Sometimes passenger victims are able to rely upon res ipsa loqui-
tur in negligence cases. In addition, proving a plane defective in a strict liability
case is often very difficult. Thus, these factors narrow the differences in legal treat-
ment between the two types of defendants. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 200.
Twenty years ago it was estimated that 7% of domestic commercial air crash
claimants were failing to recover in tort. See Note, A Proposal for Absolute Liability,
supra note 1, at 573 (relying upon International Civil Aviation (ICAO), Special
ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-2, at 124 (1966)). This 7% figure is
probably misleadingly low for that era since the estimate did not consider the
victims or their heirs who never filed a claim. Nor does the percentage take ac-
count of claimants who may have recovered dramatically discounted awards be-
cause of the weakness of their legal claim; such people are treated as successful
claimants. Moreover, many cases remained pending at the time the report was
compiled, raising the possibility that a higher proportion of those claimants even-
tually recovered nothing. In most recent tort cases involving the major airlines,
either the air carriers or the manufacturers ultimately admit legal responsibility
for the crash, even if they formally deny their negligence or the defectiveness of
their airplane and fight among themselves over the funding of payouts to the
claimants. For some confirmation of this position, see Need for Uniform Legislation,
supra note 4, at 633. But even if the liability issue rarely goes to a jury, this fact
does not prevent huge expenditures for discovery as the opposing lawyers jockey
for the best negotiating positions on which to base the settlements.
11 See generally Kennedy, Accidents in Commercial Air Transportation-A Proposed Re-
form of the Liability and Compensation System, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 247, 248 (1975)
[hereinafter Accidents in Commercial Air Transportation] (discussing shortfalls of the
present tort system). This Article concerns personal injury and death but does not
consider the problem of loss allocation for damage to or destruction of the air-
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trying to agree upon a replacement system.' 0
II. No-FAULT SOLUTIONS?
A. The "Typical" No-Fault Plan
One alternative to the existing tort system for domestic
flights is the system which governs international flights.
Under the international system established by treaty, a
ceiling has been placed on the amount of recoverable tort
damages in exchange for the imposition of strict liability
on the air carrier."' This can be viewed as a type of a no-
fault system since air carrier negligence is no longer
relevant.
This solution differs from automobile no-fault plans,
for example, in that auto accident victims assert claims on
craft or other property. Plainly, the loss of the airplane involves an enormous sum
and contract law would seem to provide a suitable basis for resolving whether the
carrier or manufacturers (and their insurers) should pay.
,0 I do not consider here the many proposals that are aimed at shoring up the
present system through procedural reforms. The bolder of such reforms advocate
a federal statute that would subject all domestic commercial air crash tort suits to
federal jurisdiction, consolidate the claims of all victims of the same crash, and
apply a single law to such cases. Milder versions look to the adoption of a uniform
state law by many of the key states in air crash litigation. For a discussion of
proposals of this sort, see Note, Aviation Tort Liability: The Need for A Comprehensive
Federal Aviation Liability Act, 15J. MAR. L. REV. 177, 184-86 (1982).
11 The Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Hague Protocol and the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement, provides that carriers are virtually absolutely liable for
injuries or deaths to their passengers on international flights. In return, the tort
claims of victims or their heirs are limited to $75,000. See Haskell, The Warsaw
System and the U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39J. AIR L. & CoM. 483, 483-90 (1973). See
also, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982); Protocol to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371; Civil Aeronautics Board, Agreement 18900, Agreement Relating to
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, ap-
proved by Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E-23680 (May 13, 1966), reprinted in
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982). In recent years United States courts have allowed
various plaintiffs to avoid that ceiling. See, e.g., Note, The Warsaw Convention and
Montreal Agreement Permit the Award of Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest in Addi-
tion to the $75,000 Liability Limitation, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 375, 381 (1985). See
generally DeVivo, The Warsaw Convention:Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49 J. AIR
L. & COM. 71, 76-81 (1983) (criticizing the Warsaw Convention's limitation of
liability).
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a first party basis from their own insurer,1 2 whereas inter-
national air crash victims make claims against the airline
or its insurer. The source of the insurance, however, is
hardly critical. The international air crash situation is
analagous to a workers' compensation plan. Under that
no-fault scheme the victim also claims, not from his own
insurance, but rather from his employer or its insurer.' 3
More important, then, are the differences between the
award structure for international air crashes and other no-
fault plans. The international system retains the tort sys-
tem's basis for recovery, including pain and suffering
damages, and simply caps the plaintiff's total award.14
Although there is often no aggregate ceiling, 15 under
workers' compensation, by contrast, wages are only par-
tially replaced and tort-like compensation is not paid for
pain and suffering.16 In further contrast, no-fault auto in-
surance, as enacted in various states, both limits coverage
to pecuniary losses and imposes a ceiling on recovery. 17
But, unlike workers' compensation, no-fault auto insur-
ance plans additionally permit the victim to pursue his
claim in tort;' 8 and, unlike international air crash claims,
12 See generally O'Connell & Beck, An Update of the Surveys on the Operation of No-
Fault Auto Laws, 674 INS. L.J. 129 (1979) (discussing operation of no-fault automo-
bile laws).
13 See generally J. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: THE ROLE OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 17-28 (1977).
14 Under American law general damages of significant amounts are awarded,
even in death cases. Although jurisdictions typically disallow recovery for "grief,"
some jurisdictions may award large sums for the heirs' loss of companionship and
services and, when the facts plausibly justify the claim, the victim's severe pain and
suffering before his or her death. See Need for Uniform Legislation, supra note 4, at
613-14.
15 A number of states, however, limit death benefits to a maximum. See 2, 4 A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Ch. XI, § 64.00 & app. B, table
16 (1986).
6 In many states, however, compensation paid for "impairments" in partial
permanent disability cases seems to contain a pain and suffering component and
is not limited solely to loss of earning capacity. See id. at Ch. X §§ 57.00, 58.00.
17 See O'Connell & Beck, supra note 12, at 137.
I- Id. Originally a compensation claim was more clearly the worker's sole rem-
edy. Lately, however, several courts have carved out exceptions to the exclusive
remedy rule, and now a not insignificant proportion ofjob accidents result in both
workers' compensation and tort claims. See generally Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive
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such suits are not subject to a ceiling. Thus, victims of
negligent driving may recover for both serious pain and
suffering and any other pecuniary losses that remain un-
compensated by the no-fault auto insurance system.'"
Clearly, it is impossible to say what is "the" no-fault al-
ternative to tort law. Nonetheless, I do think it fair to say
that most no-fault advocates would not choose the inter-
national air crash solution if asked to design a no-fault
plan for domestic air crashes. The plan more likely would
be one in which, in exchange for his tort claim, the air passenger
or his heirs would be entitled to recover from the carrier, regardless
offault and without limit, all or at least a generous proportion of
income losses and all out-of-pocket expenses caused by the crash.
Nothing would be paid for pain and suffering or other general dam-
ages.20  I will call this the "Typical" No-Fault Plan. This
discussion, however, by no means exhausts the possibili-
ties for eliminating consideration of both fault and tort
law's approach to damages.
B. The Standard Insurance Plan
A different no-fault idea would require carriers to pro-
vide, along with every airline ticket, a standardized
Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1648-
53 (1983).
1o See O'Connell & Beck, supra note 12, at 140-4 1. No-fault auto insurance juris-
dictions typically bar tort awards for relatively small amounts of pain and suffer-
ing. As predicted by no-fault advocates, these thresholds seem to have led to a
large drop in tort claims. See Hammitt & Rolph, Limiting Liability for Automobile
Accidents: Are No-Fault Tort Thresholds Effective?, 7 LAw & POL'Y 493, 495, 504
(1985).
20 See, e.g., Need for Uniform Legislation, supra note 4, at 633-36 (critical discussion
of the Air Travel Protection Act). Under the no-fault plan proposed by William F.
Kennedy, pain and suffering awards would be available only in injury cases involv-
ing permanent disability or disfigurement. Accidents in Commercial Air Transporta-
tion, supra note 9, at 252. Applying Professor O'Connell's proposals for elective
no-fault insurance to the air crash setting, air carriers seemingly would be exempt
from tort suits if, in advance, they agreed to provide all passengers and their heirs
the type of pecuniary damages envisioned by the proposal discussed in the text.
See O' CONNELL, supra note 1, at 97. For examples of other no-fault proposals not
otherwise noted here, see, e.g., Hardman, Aircraft Passenger Accident Law: A Reap-
praisal, 465 INS. LJ. 688 (1961); Graubart, Liability for Aircraft Crashes, 31 PA.
B.A.Q. 11 (1959); Sweeney, Is SpecialAviation Liability Legislation Essential?, (pts. I &
2), 19J. AIR L. & COM. 166, 317 (1952).
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amount of accidental death and injury insurance that
would replace the victim's tort claim. I call this the Stan-
dard Insurance Plan. For example, each passenger might
be given $200,000 in insurance coverage for the risk of
death. Since air crashes that cause any serious injuries
often result in death,2 ' this accidental death insurance
would be the key benefit. Nonetheless, this plan also
would provide ordinary disability and/or accident insur-
ance protection for those injured but not killed-such as
so many dollars a week for the duration of one's disability
and/or so many dollars in a lump sum for listed dismem-
berments and other impairments. 2
The Standard Insurance Plan would be an elegantly
simple no fault scheme with many attractive features.
Crash victims or their heirs could obtain prompt payment
of a fairly substantial sum. The plan would be cheap to
administer and virtually lawyer-free, at least in contrast to
the tort system. Moreover, under this no-fault proposal,
unlike today's system, each passenger would receive equal
treatment.
C. Chalk's "Market Insurance Plan"
Professor Andrew Chalk recently has proposed a quite
different scheme. He recommends replacing existing tort
litigation for commercial air crashes with what he calls the
"Market Insurance Plan."' 23 Although his proposal is ir-
ritatingly vague, the basic idea is that instead of suits for
21 Data from twenty years ago showed that fatalities accounted for more than
78% of the claims received by the airlines and for more than 89% of the amounts
paid in damages. Note, A Proposalfor Absolute Liability, supra note 1, at n.54. See also
National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data
(1981) (showing that approximately 58% of those involved in large air carrier
accidents were either killed or seriously injured, while 35% suffered no injury and
7% suffered only minor injuries).
22 In 1975 Congressman Dale Milford proposed a no-fault scheme for commer-
cial air crashes that would provide a uniform (unspecified) amount to all death
victims but would award injured victims amounts up to that ceiling based upon
tort damage rules. Milford, A No-Fault Aviation Insurance Plan, 41J. AIR L. & COM.
211, 216 (1975). This idea lies somewhere between the Warsaw Convention's
solution for international air travel and the Standard Insurance Plan.
2 Chalk, supra note 3, at 220.
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damages, air crash victims and their survivors would re-
cover from first party insurance, if any, that passengers
have bought to cover such accidents.24 In short, instead
of having the law determine the amount of air crash insur-
ance provided, as in the Standard Insurance Plan, each
passenger would decide for himself or herself how much
to obtain and would buy that coverage in the market from
the carriers themselves, airport vendors, travel agents,
etc.25
III. THE FALLACY OF PROMOTING SAFE AIR TRAVEL AND
PROPER RESOURCE ALLOCATION THROUGH
COMPENSATION SCHEMES
A. Air Crash Reform Proposals as Examples of Tailored
Compensation Plans
Contrasting the various solutions previously canvassed,
the critical difference lies in who (or what) determines the
amount of compensation paid. Under the Typical No-
Fault Plan compensation is based, in the tradition of tort
law, on an after-the-crash determination of the individual
victim's legislatively allowable pecuniary losses. Under
the Standard Insurance Plan the legislature specifies uni-
form sums in advance for all victims. Under Chalk's pro-
posal the victim determines in advance the amount to be
paid.
Despite their differences, all of these approaches share
a common commitment to financing the scheme so that
air crash compensation benefits are in some way attached
to the cost of air travel. That is why all of these schemes
are examples of "tailored compensation plans." 26 In such
plans not only are benefits tailored to a special class of
accidents, but also the benefits are meant to be paid for as
part of the cost of engaging in the activity that leads to
such accidents-whether, as in Chalk's plan by the air pas-
24 Id. at 239-40.
2.1 For further discussion of Chalk's Market Insurance Plan, see infra notes 52-61
and accompanying text.
26 See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 622-28.
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senger directly, or, as in the other approaches, by the air-
lines who then seek to pass the costs on to the passenger
in the ticket price.
"Tailored compensation plans" have been proposed
for a wide range of injuries as varied as those caused by
drug side effects,27 railway crashes,28 medical accidents,29
and schoolyard mishaps.3 ° In support of such "tailoring,"
many claim that compensation of victims is not the only
concern. First, supporters typically see a tailored financ-
ing mechanism as also promoting the safer conduct of the
activity in question, such as air transport. Second, many
supporters contend that it is "only proper" that activities
(air travel in this instance) carry their full costs, including
their accident costs. 3 I Hence, I concede that to the extent
that advocates of "tailored compensation plan" solutions
to the air crash problem make similar claims, they have
plenty of company.
Yet, I have concluded that tailored compensation plans,
serving as a remedy for the problem of air crashes, are the
wrong solution to the failure of tort law. To explain why,
I will consider first the two key non-compensatory goals
previously identified-safety and the proper allocation of
costs. Initially, this examination will focus on the Typical
No-Fault solution, the Standard Insurance Plan, and the
existing tort system. 32 Subsequently, this Article will con-
sider these two non-compensatory goals in connection
with Professor Chalk's plan.33 Finally, having shown all
such mechanisms to be rather unimportant to the achieve-
27 See, e.g., Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 297
(1982); Merrill, Compensationfor Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1 (1973).
29 Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV. L. REV.
705 (1916).
29 See, e.g., Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance" - Has Its Time Come?, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1233.
30 Kimball, Compulsion Without Protection or Recourse. The Casefor No-Fault Accident
Insurancefor School Children, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 925.
11 Moreover, commentators often argue that a tailored no-fault scheme accom-
plishes the "internalization of costs" goal better than the tort system.
• 2 See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
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ment of those goals, the last part of this Article explores
what a proper compensation system should look like.
There I also find fault with tailored compensation
schemes and propose reforms which concentrate on basic
social insurance and the employee benefit system.3 4
B. Promoting Safe Air Travel
Quite apart from either tort law or a typical no-fault
substitute, various forces already promote safe commer-
cial air travel.3 5 First, most of those in charge of design-
ing, building, maintaining, and flying airplanes surely feel
moral obligations towards passengers and crew and
would be mortified were their lack of care to cause an avi-
ation disaster. Second, self-protection assures that the
crew, who are also at risk in a crash, will take great care
during the flight. Third, and possibly most important,
considerable direct governmental safety regulation, pri-
marily through the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), governs the commercial air travel business.3 6 Fi-
nally, ordinary market forces should guard against care-
less manufacturers and carriers. In theory at least,
whether or not manufacturers and carriers are liable for
the deaths and injuries caused by air crashes, these enter-
prises ought to be pressured to exercise great care be-
cause of the fear that an unsafe reputation could cause a
dramatic loss of consumer patronage that would far more
than outweigh the savings that would have been achieved
by skimping on safety.
Indeed, Professor Chalk's economic model and empiri-
cal studies support this last factor. Assuming we accept
s See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 206; infra note 36 and accompanying text.
36 The FAA has promulgated detailed regulations covering all aspects of large
commercial aircraft operation. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.1-.311, 121.1-.713 (1986).
The FAA also has regulations for air taxis and commuter airlines. 14 C.F.R.§§ 135.1-.443 (1986). Evidence that these regulations promote safety can be
found in F. Munley, Commuter Airlines Safety: An Analysis of Accident Records and the
Role of Federal Regulation (1976), reprinted in Airline Deregulation and Aviation Safety:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. 8 at 360 (1977).
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his results, Chalk's findings show that whenever a manu-
facturer's plane crashes due to an apparent defect in the
plane, the price of the manufacturer's shares drops
sharply on the stock market.37 I agree with Chalk's inter-
pretation of this result that this loss in value does not sim-
ply reflect the impending tort damages that now will have
to be paid, although that may be part of the cause of the
drop s.3  Rather, the drop in stock price importantly re-
flects a feared loss of future patronage on, and hence a
loss of carrier demand for, that type of aircraft. Since en-
terprises want to avoid both current loss of share value
and future loss of customers, this study shows how the
stock market can provide a good feedback mechanism for
stimulating safe air transport.
Thus, I conclude that moral, self-preservation, regula-
tory, and market forces probably make air travel as safe as
feasible, at least without spending much more money than
the traveling public is willing to pay.3 9 Moreover, there is
little reason to believe that the fear of civil liability under
the present system, or concerns about higher costs under
the Typical No-Fault Plan or the Standard Insurance Plan,
add, or would add, to air travel safety. Since most air
crash claims today are settled and since the National
Transportation Safety Board investigates and reports
upon all commercial air crashes, tort law clearly does not
serve the functions of public condemnation or the pub-
licizing of air carrier/manufacturer carelessness. In addi-
tion, of course, no-fault plans disavow the imposition of
blame.
Tort liability, the Typical No-Fault solution, and the
Standard Insurance Plan essentially represent, or would
represent, additional, unpredictable costs of doing busi-
ness, especially in the case of tort law. Enterprises in the
air transportation business seek (or under a no-fault plan
37 Chalk, supra note 3, at 227-39.
- See id. at 231 n.41.
.- For a discussion of these points in the context of tort law generally, see
Sugarman, supra note I, at 559-90.
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would seek) to regularize these costs through insurance
arrangements. But, as already noted, the funding of pay-
ments to victims is hardly the only cost a crash carries.
Indeed, besides the potential loss of future business dis-
cussed above, carriers and manufacturers incur the impor-
tant costs of lowered employee morale and the diversion
of employee attention in the aftermath of the crash.
These costs occur (or would occur) irrespective of the
civil liability or no-fault benefit aspects of the event. In
theory, an air carrier or manufacturer that would invest
$X in safety if it did not have to pay for its accident costs
would invest $X + Y when faced with the prospect of
either tort or no-fault plan costs. I assert, however, that in
practice enterprises are not able to cut things so fine or to
make such distinctions-so that in the end Y does not re-
ally amount to anything.
Suppose air carriers and manufacturers were relieved of
the cost of tort liability today and a no-fault plan were not
put in its place. While I foresee that this could lead to a
small reduction in the price of airline tickets, I do not
foresee cutbacks in safety. I cannot envision exactly what
safety procedures and practices the air industry would de-
lete. Is there reason to think, for example, that British
Airways, Lufthansa, and Air France are less safe airlines
than United, American, and TWA because under the laws
of Britain, Germany, and France the former carriers pay
far less in tort damages in domestic crashes than their
American counterparts?
This is not to say that all airlines and manufacturers to-
day actually take all the care they might;40 in fact, careless-
ness, to the extent it exists, continues despite tort liability.
Indeed, some commentators claim that the fear of tort lia-
4o Three relatively recent books which have closely examined specific commer-
cial air crash disasters argue that the industry could be safer than it is. J. NANCE,
BLIND TRUST (1986) (claiming that deregulation has lead to increased risks of avi-
ation accidents); W. NORRIS, WILLFUL MISCONDUCT (1984) (discussing the crash of
Pan American Flight 806 at Pago Pago on Jan. 30, 1974); P. EDDY, E. POTrER & B.
PAGE, DESTINATION DISASTER (1976) (discussing the causes and consequences of
the first jumbo jet disaster).
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bility actually retards the development and introduction
of newer and safer aircraft.4 ' In the same vein, critics
have charged that because the key commercial actors want
to avoid civil liability, tort law actually promotes the
cover-up of the causes of air crashes, which in turn threat-
ens future danger to the flying public.42 Surely, careless-
ness due to unavoidable human errors and management
incompetence often occurs independently of tort law and,
unfortunately, would continue under a no-fault system.43
For these reasons, I reject the premise that tort law, the
Typical No-Fault solution, or the Standard Insurance Plan
has, or would have, an important positive impact on air
safety.44
C. Allocating Its Accident Costs to Air Transportation
Putting the question of safety aside for now, modern
economic analysis has shown that the central purpose of
making activities pay their way is to cause the activity to be
priced "right." The idea is that if activities do not bear
their accident costs, then they are, in effect, improperly
subsidized in the same way as if their labor or materials
costs were subsidized. The problem with such activities
" Milford, supra note 22, at 214-15. See also Martin, supra note 2, at 232. But see
Brennan, No-Fault Insurance in Aviation Products and Services-One Insurer's Viewpoint,
41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 237, 240 (1975).
42 Milford, supra note 22, at 212-14. Contra Brennan, supra note 41, at 238.
43 A changed economic climate for the airline industry, caused partly by the
increased competition that has stemmed from deregulation, may also lead, or al-
ready has led, to a degraded maintenance program by the carriers (or at least
some of them). But, once again, this threat to air safety (which assumes that com-
petitor pressure is outweighing consumer pressure) is independent of, and, if
true, is occurring in the face of, tort law.
41 A similar conclusion about tort law and safety is reached in Note, A Proposal
for Absolute Liability, supra note 1, at 581-82. Without convincing argument, that
author claims that a proper no-fault/absolute liability scheme actually might in-
crease carrier safety efforts. Non-legal studies on air carrier safety essentially dis-
regard the possibility that tort liability and/or insurance costs could contribute
importantly to air safety. See, e.g., J. MEYER & C. OSTER, DEREGULATION AND THE
NEW AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS 88-101 (1984) (contrasting passengers' perceptions
and statistical data on safety and implying a limited role, at most, for factors such
as tort law and insurance costs). But see Kreindler, Our Tort System and Aviation
Safety, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 497, 502-03 (1968) (defending tort law as a promoter
of safety written by one of America's leading air crash litigators).
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being "too cheap" is not that those engaged in such activ-
ities will make unfair profits (which is unlikely), but rather
that society's resources will be misallocated. Too many
resources will flow to the subsidized activity rather than to
other unsubsidized activities. The trouble with misalloca-
tion is not so much a matter of fair treatment among rail-
ways, bus companies, and airlines, although competing
business interests may complain if one gets what is
thought to be an inappropriate break. Rather, overall
consumer welfare supposedly is reduced when consump-
tion patterns are diverted from the efficient allocation of
resources achieved when all costs are internalized and
each item carries its true market price.45
For example, assume that coal-fired electricity generat-
ing plants cause pollution and hydroelectric plants do not
and that manufacturers of electricity do not pay for such
pollution. All other things being equal, more resources
likely will be devoted to coal-fired plants creating more
pollution than if such costs were internalized. With inter-
nalization, by contrast, producers probably would shift to
more hydroelectric plants or away from electricity to
other energy sources. Whatever shift occurs will harm
consumers of the formerly "subsidized" coal-produced
electricity in the form of higher prices. Yet, the gain to the
former pollution victims, who will now have cleaner air, is
presumably greater.
The question of proper cost allocation in cases of pas-
senger deaths and injuries from air crashes appears to be
somewhat different from that arising in cases of air pollu-
tion. Only in the latter type of setting does the activity
generate harm to outsiders. By contrast, since passengers
are part of the air transport transaction, they, like pur-
chasers who might be injured by consumer goods gener-
ally, initially internalize the accident costs of the activity
whether or not the provider of the goods or services must
41 For a general discussion of the theory of externalities and their role in dis-
torting the allocation of resources, see W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
568-71, 641-47 (2d ed. 1978).
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treat such accident losses as part of its cost structure. In
other words, unlike outsider pollution victims, customers
will either bear their actual losses as victims or else share
those costs as a group through the presumably higher
travel costs that accompany any mechanism of internal-
izing accident costs to the carriers (and manufacturers),
whether it be tort law or a no-fault scheme. (This analysis
also illustrates that, in the case of air passengers, the claim
that "industry" should pay for these costs is largely a will-
o-the-wisp.)
Still, as Dean Calabresi has pointed OUt, 4 6 if consumer
victims bear accident costs in the form of actual losses,
they may, at the time of purchase of the good or service,
overlook that cost and thus, in our example, undercalcu-
late the real price of air travel when making their trans-
portation choice. This undercalculation could occur
because people are not adequately informed about the
probabilistic cost of an air crash or because they psycho-
logically discount or entirely ignore the small risk to them
as individuals. Moreover, individuals may well make alter-
native provisions for covering those losses through mech-
anisms that have nothing to do with air travel, such as
through ordinary life insurance.4 7 In such cases, since
compensation for death risks from air travel would attract
no marginal cost to the flyer, this also would tend to make
the activity of flying "too cheap."
As a result, for the purpose of this analysis, I am willing
to stipulate that, in theory at least, if the costs of injuries
and deaths to passengers are not firmly attached to air
travel, this form of transportation will be subsidized.
What I am not willing to stipulate, however, and what I
think makes this issue both intractable and ultimately ir-
relevant, is the claim that this type of air travel subsidy
necessarily leads to allocating "too many" resources to
this activity. The internalization argument can only sensi-
- See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 56 (1970).
47 For a further discussion of consumers' choices in covering accident costs, see
infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
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bly apply when the activity is otherwise priced "right." If
not, we do not know whether including the cost of injuries
and deaths helps push the price to (or at least towards) its
proper level, or whether instead this internalization makes
air travel too expensive and thereby worsens the alloca-
tion of social resources.48 In the case of air transport,
market imperfections and other unintended or theoreti-
cally undesirable subsidies and/or charges probably al-
ready have caused this activity to be either too expensive
or too cheap-but we can not tell which. After all, even
with air fare deregulation, so many special non-market
factors remain in the air transport field (and indeed in the
competing transport sectors as well) 49 making the issue of
the proper allocation of passenger crash costs a minor fly
in a great deal of ointment. 50
In sum, taking away tort liability costs and not imposing
a no-fault plan's costs in its place would likely lead to both
(slightly) cheaper air tickets and (slightly) more flying.
Whether this would be a gain or a loss in the overall allo-
cation of social resources, however, no one can confi-
dently say. Besides, if the efficient allocation of air crash
costs remained an important concern, it could be far bet-
ter served by eliminating tort suits and simply adopting,
not a no-fault plan, but rather a tax on air travel equal to
the estimated cost of air transport accidents. 5 1
48 When market failures exist other than the one sought to be cured, a correc-
tion of that one impediment will not lead to an optimal (or even preferred) alloca-
tion of resources. For a presentation of this result, see Lipsey & Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57).
49 Factors in the air transport field include special landing charges and other
taxes faced by airline companies; airport, airway, and aircraft purchase subsidies;
and military development subsidies. Factors in the competing transport sectors
include the national highway building program, Amtrak subsidies, and gasoline
taxes. For a general discussion of factors that prevent the air transport industry
from being truly competitive, see W. O'CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE
ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1985).
50 In 1975 liability insurance cost large aircraft manufacturers "less than one
half of one percent of their gross annual sales." Brennan, supra note 41, at 239.
In 1964 fault liability insurance cost air carriers 23 cents per ticket. Note, A Propo-
salfor Absolute Liability, supra note 1, at 589.
-51Indeed, such a tax could more accurately impose the full social costs of air
crashes on air travel than does the present tort system or than would the Typical
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D. Air Safety and Accident Cost Allocation Under the Chalk
Plan
Professor Chalk argues that because major air crashes
are well publicized and because air passengers can readily
choose among airlines and equipment, the market itself
creates strong economic incentives for air safety. This ar-
gument leads him to reject the need for our society to rely
upon either tort law or a no-fault plan for that purpose.
With this ultimate conclusion I agree, although for the
rather broader reasons given earlier.
Professor Chalk, however, also claims that his "Market
Insurance Plan" will promote safety. I judge those pros-
pects as extremely unpromising. Under Chalk's plan, for
safety to be even theoretically pursued (1) air travel insur-
ance will have to be provided in a way that is calculated to
put economic pressure on airlines and aircraft manufac-
turers to be safer, and (2) people will actually have to
purchase the compensation protection they want for this
risk through the kind of insurance Chalk has in mind.
Even if the first condition can be arranged (about which I
am quite skeptical), the latter is highly implausible.
Although Chalk is very sparse on details, suppose first
that he would insist that every carrier offer insurance for
each of its flights. Assume further that all carriers would
charge the same price for this insurance, at least for com-
parable flights.52 Under this arrangement, since a carrier
with a worse crash loss experience would face higher
costs, then, in principle, fear of such costs would appear
to give each carrier economic incentives to maintain or
improve its safety record. 3 But this is not the end of the
No-Fault system. In the latter two instances, the costs imposed are merely the
outcome of award arrangements (and accompanying administrative costs) that are
primarily determined with a different goal, compensation, in mind. A tax
designed solely for proper resource allocation purposes would not be so
hampered.
52 Alternatively, assume that even if price differences existed for other reasons,
a carrier with a worse loss experience would not dare charge more for its insur-
ancefor that reason.
.1 Note, that I do not mean by this discussion to give up my belief that these
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analysis.
Realizing that many crashes are beyond the carrier's
control and that crashes can be extremely costly and can
occur quite unevenly among carriers, the airlines surely
would look to regular insurance companies to reinsure
them. Therefore, in order to prevent the airline industry
from avoiding the above described economic incentives
on behalf of safety, the regular insurance companies, in
the Chalkian world, would have to impose inspection and
other safety pressures (including, perhaps, experience rat-
ing of their insurance costs) on their carrier clients. Our
experience with tort law, however, suggests that the effec-
tiveness of this indirect pressure is highly doubtful.54
More realistically under Chalk's proposal, air travelers
would be buying their flight-by-flight insurance, not from
the airlines, but directly from regular insurance compa-
nies, either at the airport or perhaps via travel agents.55
Under this arrangement these insurance companies would
not likely have any any important leverage so as to be able
to police the safety of the air carriers, whatever the insur-
ers' theoretical leverage might be under the reinsurance
arrangement described above. After all, a market for first
party flight insurance already exists, although somehow
one would not know it from Chalk's article. People cur-
rently can purchase such insurance at counters and from
machines at most airports. 56 But, from the air safety per-
sorts of economic pressures in fact would have no important further impact on
safety-that is, beyond those efforts already prompted by other existing pressures.
See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
54 See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 573-81 (discussing liability insurance and
deterrence).
ss Indeed, Chalk's assumption seems to be that commercial insurance compa-
nies (as compared with the carriers themselves) would be the key, if not the exclu-
sive, sellers of this insurance to the traveling public. See Chalk, supra note 3, at
239-40.
. In 1976 nearly all of the 3.7 million policies, which cost United States con-
sumers $18 million, were sold by two companies, their subsidiaries, and
franchises; Mutual of Omaha's company, Tele-Trip, accounted for about $13.5
million of the total. See Problems in the Sale of Travel Insurance at Airport Locations:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 219 (1978) [hereinafter Travel Insurance Hearings].
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spective, the experience with this market is not very prom-
ising. No evidence suggests that the sellers of existing
flight insurance contribute in any important way to mak-
ing airlines or aircraft manufacturers behave more care-
fully. Therefore, I would be very surprised to see flight
insurance sellers heavily involved in safety promotion
under Chalk's plan. Charging customers different prices
for flight insurance depending upon the carrier and/or
equipment selected by the customer is one possible re-
sponse of insurance companies to differential risks.
This practice, however, has not developed in the existing
flight insurance market and is not likely to do so under
Chalk's plan.5 8
Nevertheless, even if Chalk were to work out a flight
insurance scheme which has at least theoretical appeal
from the safety promoting perspective, for the proper
economic pressures to come into play, people would have
to protect against the financial risk of air crashes by actu-
ally purchasing that sort of insurance. Just as most travel-
ers today do not take care of their financial concerns
57 See Chalk, supra note 3, at 240. At one point Chalk appears to assume that
exactly this sort of fine tuning in pricing would happen.
58 Charging different prices would make the sales transaction quite cumber-
some, indeed baffling to many passengers. Also, different pricing would force the
insurers into strenuous battles with any carrier for whom a higher rate were pro-
posed. Plausibly, the threat to differentiate among carriers could be used as lever-
age to give the insurers the ability to insist on inspections of carrier safety
practices which Chalk blithely assumes would follow from his plan. See id.
Consider, however, these remarks from someone heavily involved in air travel
liability insurance:
It would be a great act of effrontery to attempt to tell these folks
[large manufacturers and scheduled carriers] how to build a safe air-
plane and how to run a safe airline .... [T]he state of the art has
advanced to where it is not feasible for insurers to attempt routinely
to judge engineering and operational conclusions on the frontiers of
industry knowledge .... Punishment, deterrence and enforcement
do not belong in a tort action.
Whitehead, The Role of the Insurance Company in Air Safety, 34J. AIR L. & CoM. 450,
451, 453, 455 (1968) (statement of the Vice President of United States Aviation
Underwriters, Inc.). Consider as well this admission from another representative
of the aviation liability insurance industry: "I must admit that the accident investi-
gation area is one in which the aviation insurance industry has been derelict in its
duty and can be justifiably criticized." Brennan, supra note 41, at 238 (statement
of the Executive Vice President of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.).
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about the risks of flying through the purchase of existing
flight-by-flight insurance, it is inconceivable that most
people would do so if Chalk's first party plan were in place
and no tort rights were available.59
First, many air travelers, through their employment or
through a separately acquired policy, already have a blan-
ket life (or life and accident) insurance policy covering air
crashes on any commercial flight they take.6 ° Perhaps this
kind of coverage would expand if tort claims were elimi-
nated. Indeed, Chalk seems to envision that people could
obtain insurance under his plan for more than one flight
at a time.6 ' Presently, however, the cost of this type of
insurance is not tied to the individual airlines or equip-
ment flown or to the number of flights flown. Thus, I find
it hard to imagine that the market would yield fine-tuned,
safety-oriented pricing under Chalk's plan. Nor is there
any indication that these insurers have, or could have, im-
portant influences on the safety practices of the industry.
Second, the chances of promoting safe travel indirectly
through pressures imposed by insurers are even less likely
given the many travelers who do not consider the risk of
an air crash as something needing separate insurance pro-
59 More than eight years ago it was estimated that only "1 of 100, at best" buy
flight insurance at the airport. Travel Insurance Hearings, supra note 56, at 240. Es-
timates also indicate that 1.1% of passengers at Washington's Dulles and National
Airports buy such insurance and that over time the proportion of people who
purchase airport flight insurance is declining. Id. at 478, 508.
-0 Travel insurance covering business travel is an increasingly popular em-
ployee benefit. Id. at 224. Some credit card companies automatically provide
flight insurance if the customer charges the flight on that card; others emphasize
selling annual flight insurance policies to their cardholders. Id. Frequent travel-
ers may select annual policies covering all flights during the year, rather than
flight-by-flight policies, not only for the convenience but also for the lower cost.
Airport vendors also sell annual policies, although as of eight years ago, at least,
these policies typically would cost twice as much as essentially identical policies
sold by many credit card companies and others through the mail. Id. at 548. Air-
port vendors also sell travel insurance for selected periods (e.g., two weeks) cover-
ing accident risks on the ground as well. as in the air. See id. at 269. Indeed,
although 59% of the policies Tele-Trip sold in 1976 covered only a single sched-
uled flight, less Tele-Trip income was being generated from such policies than
from either of its other two main airport products-annual flight insurance and
the broader holiday insurance. Id. at 276, 549.
61 See Chalk, supra note 3, at 240.
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tection. Instead, these travelers protect themselves and
their dependents through basic compensation and insur-
ance devices such as ordinary life insurance, Social Secur-
ity, and disability insurance. To the extent that people
already have provided for themselves and their families
through such basic compensation sources, Chalk surely
would not force them to buy extra air crash insurance. Af-
ter all, Chalk highly values allowing people to buy only
the amounts of insurance they want. But, these collateral
compensation providers are simply not in the business of
promoting safe air travel.
The upshot is that under Chalk's scheme there is likely
to be little use of insurance mechanisms that have any
hope, even in principle, of promoting air safety. For the
same reasons, Chalk's plan probably would be even worse
than the Typical No-Fault Plan or the Standard Insurance
Plan at internalizing the costs of air crashes into the price
of air travel. In short, Chalk ought to abandon the idea of
pursuing non-compensatory goals through whatever de-
tailed insurance mechanism he settles on. Instead, the
mechanism should be judged solely by its ability to pro-
vide compensation.
IV. APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION FOR AIR
CRASH VICTIMS
A. Victim Pre-Selection of the Benefit Level: The Chalk View
Despite its elegant simplicity, the Standard Insurance
Plan, which pre-specifies a uniform schedule of benefits
for all air crash victims (e.g., $200,000 in case of death),
fails to respond to the different compensation needs of
the victims and their heirs. Importantly, these needs can
vary both because of different dollar amounts of the losses
that individuals incur and because of the alternative provi-
sions that people have made for such losses. Since any
legislatively pre-specified set of benefits for air crash vic-
tims would not reflect what most individual passengers
would buy if they had the option, from the compensation
perspective air passengers should not be forced to
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purchase such uniform coverage when they pay for their
flight. Indeed, Professor Chalk has followed this line of
thought and has proposed arrangements under which in-
dividual passengers would choose, and pay for, their own
level of coverage.
Yet, if each passenger makes an individual decision, as
Chalk proposes, there would probably be extremely high
administrative costs, especially if this decision is made for
each flight the passenger takes.6 2  Moreover, although
Chalk's plan assumes that buyers of such insurance are
well informed and behave rationally, airport-purchased
insurance probably depends (and would depend), at least
to a degree, on last minute fears and superstitions of pas-
sengers.63 This concern would be only partly mitigated if
62 Chalk talks of administrative costs of "five to ten percent" of each premium
dollar, implying benefit payouts of approximately ninety to ninety-five percent.
Chalk, supra note 3, at 247. This estimate seems wildly unrealistic in view of the
existing experience with airport-purchased flight insurance. In 1970 the New
York Superintendent of Insurance pressured flight insurance sellers at New York
terminals to raise their approximate loss ratios (i.e., their ratio of benefits paid to
premium dollars collected) from 25% to 40%. See W. YOUNG & E. HOLMES, CASES
& MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 45 (1985) (citing Matter of Air-Trip
Ticket Accident Ins., N.Y. Dep't of Ins. (1970)). By 1978 it appeared that only
New Jersey, with its nearby Newark airport, had imposed the same higher loss
ratio. At that time, however, Mutual of Omaha officials testified that because of
limited volume, commission requirements, and especially rental burdens for their
airport locations, if states throughout the country were to go along with the New
York rule, flight insurance sellers would no longer be able to provide counter
service, presumably restricting their product to vending machines. Travel Insur-
ance Hearings, supra note 56, at 253. Those hearings also revealed that during the
1972-76 period, Tele-Trip's loss ratio nationally was only 15.4%, although given
the infrequency of air crashes, this five year period might be too short to make a
judgment about the longer term loss ratio. Id.
63 Many who buy this sort of insurance today are probably somewhat fearful of
flying and treat the insurance purchase as a sort of prayer that they reach their
destination safely. Apparently, the airlines originally supported and had their own
airport counter employees sell this type of insurance as a way of assuring people
of the safety of air travel. Travel Insurance Hearings, supra note 56, at 214-15. In-
deed, Mutual of Omaha officials have reported that their company originally en-
tered the flight insurance business, at least in part, at the instigation of members
of Mutual's board of directors who were prominent in the aviation field and who
wanted the company to help convince the public that air travel was safe by offering
cheap insurance (or at least what would appear to be cheap insurance). Id. at 237.
See generally Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Premliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 478-79 (1961) (one function of in-
surance is to provide insured with a "sense" of security).
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passengers bought insurance from travel agents when
they purchased their ticket.
Even multi-flight policies or blanket policies covering
all flights fit uneasily in the informed consumer choice
model. Those who now obtain this coverage automatically
through their work are hardly making an individual deci-
sion. Given the sometimes questionable reputation of in-
surance products sold to the public through the mail, one
may doubt whether flight insurance purchased in that way
fits within the informed consumer model either.
Chalk also ignores the societal dissatisfaction that
would arise if air travelers could to elect to provide no
protection for their survivors and thereby leave the survi-
vors with radically lowered standards of living, perhaps
even destitute and on the welfare rolls. Denying people
that sort of freedom can be termed paternalistic. Never-
theless, there seems to be no general dissatisfaction on
grounds of unwanted paternalism with other current prac-
tices that divert people's wages and force them to protect
themselves and their families against both absolute and
relative impoverishment when they must leave the
workforce due to disability, death, or retirement. Em-
ployment-based schemes for life, health, and disability in-
surance and pension benefits and compulsory public
programs like Social Security, illustrate the prevalence of
paternalistic practices. In any event, since most people do
have, and will continue to have, these and other kinds of
income loss and medical expense benefits that cover
losses from air crashes, Professor Chalk's plan can only be
a supplementary compensation arrangement.
B. No-Fault Benefits and Basic Social Insurance/Employee
Benefits
Like the Standard Insurance Plan, the Typical No-Fault
Plan's effectively paternalistic nature probably would as-
sure that an air crash did not throw the victim's heirs into
poverty. Comparing the two, however, the Typical No-
Fault Plan would be better tailored to the individual losses
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caused by air crashes than would the Standard Insurance
Plan with its legislatively pre-specified uniform package of
benefits. For example, funds that would be paid to the
estates of non-earners and earners with no dependents
under the Standard Insurance Plan could be redirected to
compensate survivors' real losses under the Typical No-
Fault Plan.
Merely measuring after-the-crash losses does not suf-
fice, however. The Typical No-Fault Plan also would ill
serve individual need unless it were sensibly integrated
with other basic sources of compensation like social insur-
ance and employee benefits. The existence of such
sources, however, diminishes the appeal of the no-fault
solution. Indeed, since so many Americans already have
basic social insurance arrangements and employee bene-
fits, any air crash no-fault plan (like tort law today) would
often be largely superfluous in replacing out-of-pocket
losses. More precisely, when people working for what
might be called "progressive employers" suffer death or
injury in an air crash (or, indeed, are killed or disabled for
nearly any other reason), their existing life insurance, oc-
cupational pension, and Social Security benefits already
provide adequate income replacement benefits for them
and their survivors. As a result, adding a compensation
layer in the form of a no-fault air crash scheme either
would result in duplicate benefits or would require cum-
bersome subrogation or deductibility arrangements.
As a matter of principle, most employee benefit and so-
cial insurance arrangements rest on the sensible view that
individuals and their survivors equally need compensation
whether death or personal injury comes from an air crash,
a car crash, or a bathtub crash.64 And, since the need for
compensation is not limited to accidents, death and disa-
bilities from other sources (illness, for example) are also
covered. Indeed, in terms of the need for compensation,
- Put differently, this view is the collective counterpart to the judgment of
many individuals who do not find it sensible to separately protect against the spe-
cial risks from air crashes, drug side effects, car injuries, etc.
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no convincing principled basis exists for selecting certain
kinds of disabling risks for special attention and
protection.65
Our existing basic social insurance and employee bene-
fit arrangements are not perfect, to be sure. For the rea-
sons stated, however, their reform, rather than the
adoption of a no-fault replacement for tort law, should
gain our attention. The goal, simply stated, should be to
put nearly everyone in a position reasonably comparable
to those in "progressive employment."
C. Improving Basic Social Insurance and Employee Benefits
Although this Article will not address the details, it will
outline some points about needed reforms in our basic
employee benefit and social insurance system in order to
indicate where efforts might be directed. For example,
survivor benefits now paid to heirs of low and moderate
earners ought to be upgraded, either through an im-
proved Social Security benefit formula or through
mandatory private occupational pension supplements to
Social Security.66 The same reform should be enacted for
65 See generally Fleming & Sugarman, Perspectives on Compensating Accident Victims,
in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES
195-98, 201 (1982) (United States); D. HARRIS, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR
ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984) (Great Britain); Ison, Tort Liability and Social Insurance,
19 U. TORONTO L.J. 614, 615 (1969) (Canada); Palmer, What Happened to the Wood-
house Report?, 1981 N.Z.L.J. 561, 568 (New Zealand).
The power of political interest groups, historical accident, the role of non-com-
pensatory objectives, inertia, and the like, rather than principles of compensation,
have given us the patchwork of actual and proposed cause-specific, fault-based,
and no-fault schemes.
c,; In general, when a Social Security covered earner dies, his or her dependent
surviving spouse is eligible for a pension if the survivor is either over age 62 or
taking care of at least one child under age 16. For a worker whose earnings have
been equal to the average in the economy for all of his or her worklife, the survi-
vors' benefits to an eligible surviving spouse and one child are designed to total
about 60% of the deceased earner's wages; a benefit of 41% of the wages of such
a worker can be collected if the eligible surviving spouse is 65 or older. For some-
one with a full worklife history of earnings at the federal minimum wage, those
benefits approximate 80% of income in the case of an eligible surviving spouse
and child and 57% for an eligible surviving elderly spouse. See 49 Soc. SEC. BULL.
12-15 (Jan. 1986). As reasonable as these percentages might sound in the ab-
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long-term disability benefits. Improvements are also
needed for brief periods of disability. The nation should
adopt either a generous government run temporary disa-
bility insurance plan (modeled partly after those now in
place in five states) 68 or a scheme requiring employers to
provide all their workers either generous short-term sick-
ness or all-purpose paid leave benefits. 69  Finally, im-
provements are needed in the protection provided to
those (and their heirs) who have not yet found their niche
in the paid work force, such as students, temporary home-
stract, surviving dependents of low and moderate earners probably will not main-
tain living standard above the poverty level, especially when more than one
surviving child remains.
With the addition of a private pension benefit of the sort typically provided by a
progressive employer, however, ordinary American families should be reasonably
well protected against the income loss caused by a breadwinner's death. A high
earner probably needs additional protection to maintain the standard of living of
his or her family in case of death. Such people can arrange additional protection,
such as the purchase of life insurance, if they wish. While lower earners in theory
could purchase life insurance that is adequate to provide for their surviving family
members, they usually do not because of the pressure of paying for day to day
living expenses.
Furthermore, workers' compensation schemes provide cash benefits to survi-
vors when the worker was killed in an accident that arose out of his or her employ-
ment. Id. at 28-35. As illustrated by the air crash problem, however, such
schemes discriminate between business air travelers and those who are flying for
pleasure or family need.
67 Social Security provides pensions to covered workers who suffer long term,
total disability from whatever source. Social Security also pays additional sums
for dependent family members. Id. at 12-15. Low and moderate earners and their
families receive distressingly low actual benefits as compared, for example, with
the poverty level. By contrast, average earners who also have good private pen-
sion benefits usually do reasonably well. High earners, as mentioned before, can
buy private disability insurance as a supplement.
- California, Hawaii, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York have cash sick-
ness programs that partially replace the incomes of those who are temporarily
disabled by non-work causes. These plans complement workers' compensation
schemes which exist in all states and pay wage loss benefits to those temporarily
disabled by job injuries. Id. at 37-41. Unfortunately, even in those states with
mandatory cash sickness programs, the benefit levels do not allow families to
maintain their ordinary expenditure levels. As a result, most "progressive em-
ployers" provide sick leave benefits that usually replace an employee's wages in
full. A nationwide cash sickness scheme, were it adopted, should sharply increase
both the wage replacement rate and the ceiling on wages covered, as compared
with existing state plans.
(is, For a fuller discussion of these ideas and my proposals for reform of short-
term benefits, see Sugarman, supra note 1, at 642-51.
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makers, the unemployed, and children.7 °
In sum, those who rightly feel dissatisfaction with the
tort law's treatment of air crashes should not cast their
sights so narrowly. If they would only look further, they
would see the compensation problems (and tort failings)
they notice are repeated elsewhere and ultimately call for
wider solutions. With generous improvements in our ba-
sic social insurance and employee systems in place, not
only would a Typical No-Fault Plan for air crashes, auto
no-fault schemes, and other tailored compensation plans
be pointless and unnecessary, but also tort remedies for
personal injuries and death could be eliminated-not just
for air crashes but for all other accidents.
On the other hand, even after improving our basic com-
pensation arrangements, there might still be room for vol-
untary choice of the type that Professor Chalk's "market
insurance plan" favors. If nothing else, our basic income
protection schemes ought to have limits allowing individ-
uals with a great deal of income at risk to protect that ex-
cess at their option and expense. If they wish to protect
their extra income from loss through air crashes by buy-
ing flight insurance as Chalk envisions, I certainly would
let them do so. Yet, I doubt many would buy it. Most of
those high earners probably would be concerned, if at all,
about risks to their income from much wider sources and
so would arrange to protect themselves with appropriately
broader first party plans.7'
CONCLUSION
Professor Chalk and various no-fault advocates too
70 Unlike the United States, many other industrialized countries provide, in one
way or another, non-contributory, non-means tested cash and medical benefits for
the disabled who have little or no attachment to the paid work force. See generally
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGH-
OUT THE WORLD (1983).
1' As one commentator noted, "Generally, special-purpose policies [including
travel and/or flight insurance] are not recommended because they are so limited
in coverage and because they are not needed if the broader commercial forms are
used." D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 256 (1 1th ed. 1983).
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often fall into the trap of trying to promote compensation,
safety, and the efficient allocation of resources with a sin-
gle policy tool. As with today's tort system, the likely re-
sult is that none of these goals would be effectively
promoted. This does not mean that no-fault advocates
and Professor Chalk are wrong to conclude that we
should work to eliminate tort suits for personal injuries
and death, both in the air crash context and elsewhere.
Tort law, however, should be replaced as a method for
dealing with accidents, not by a series of tailored compen-
sation plans, but by an improved system of social insur-
ance and employee benefits. That system should deal
generously with the financial losses caused by all disabili-
ties and deaths-not, to repeat, merely with the conse-
quences of one class of accidents. The separate goals of
safety and efficient resource allocation plainly are still
worth pursuing, but only through governmental and pri-
vate actions which are divorced from our pursuit of the
compensation goal.
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